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This paper uses an analytical approach and the precise definition of money essentiality given 
by  Scheinkman  (1980)  with  the  aim  to  establish  a  formal  theoretical  link  between  the 
possibility of hyperinflationary paths and the concept of money essentiality. In this respect the 
paper contributes to the understanding of the well known failure of Cagan based inflationary 
finance models to produce explosive hyperinflation. We consider two standard optimizing 
monetary models representing alternative ways of modelling the transaction role of money. 
The  paper  considers  a  money-in-the-utility-function  model  and  a  cash-in-advance  model 
where  representative  agent’s  preferences  are  represented  by  general  utility  functions.  We 
show that modelling monetary hyperinflation with perfect foresight is closely linked to the 
concept of money essentiality as defined by Scheinkman (1980). The possibility of explosive 
monetary hyperinflation in a perfect foresight inflationary finance model always relies on a 
sufficient level of money essentiality. The main contribution of this paper is to show that, 
whether in a cash-in-advance or in a money-in-the-utility-function framework, this sufficient 
level of money essentiality does not depend on the specific way, cash-in-advance or money-
in-the-utility-function, of modelling the role of money as a medium of exchange. 
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1 The author is grateful to Meixing DAI for his very helpful comments.   2 
1. Introduction 
 
Classical studies of hyperinflationary episodes provided an account of the stylized facts of 
hyperinflations on the basis of several observed European experiences (Bresciani-Turroni, 
1937; Cagan, 1956; Sargent, 1982). These main stylized facts characterize hyperinflation as a 
speeding up inflation unstable dynamic process where real money balances tend to vanish and 
the public deficit is financed by issuing money: these processes can be qualified as monetary 
hyperinflations
2.  Extreme  inflation  dramatically  change  economic  exchange  patterns 
compared  to  low-inflation  inflation  periods.  The  rapid  depreciation  of  money  during 
hyperinflation  induces  agents  to  spend  money  as  soon  as  they  have  got  it  (Casella  and 
Feinstein, 1990). Hyperinflation induces instability of relative price movements leading to 
large uncertainty about the outcomes of long-term contracts (Tang and Wang, 1993). As a 
consequence, hyperinflation decreases credit transactions and in general the use of long term 
contracts. As pointed out by Gutierrez and Vazquez (2004), this implies that money becomes 
more essential for purchasing goods during hyperinflation than during stable periods. 
 
The  concept  of  money  essentiality  has  been  precisely  defined  by  Scheinkman  (1980). 
According to Scheinkman (1980), the definition of money essentiality relates to the evolution 
of  inflation  tax  collected  by  government  when  the  rate  of  inflation  explodes.  Money  is 
considered as essential if the inflation tax collected by the government does not tend to zero 
when the rate of inflation explodes. Therefore, the hyperinflation process is closely related to 
money essentiality and the inflation tax. Consistently with its salient stylized facts traditional 
models of hyperinflation view hyperinflation as the result of an inflationary finance policy. 
These inflationary finance models, such as Evans and Yarrow (1981) or Bruno and Fischer 
(1990), relying on the famous Cagan (1956) money demand, consider hyperinflation as a 
speeding up inflation process driven by an accelerating rise in the money supply as a means of 
raising revenues for the government by using the inflation tax. However, since the ‘surprising 
monetarist arithmetic’ analysed in Buiter (1987) it is known that under perfect foresight these 




Given  the  well  known  failure  of  Cagan  based  inflationary  finance  models  to  produce 
explosive hyperinflation, Gutierrez and Vazquez (2004) investigate the characterization of 
agent’s  preferences  compatible  with  explosive  hyperinflation.  They  show  that 
hyperinflationary dynamics derived from standard optimizing monetary models are consistent 
with a characterization of hyperinflation as an explosive process. Possible hyperinflationary 
paths  arise  naturally  in  a  particular  basic  cash-in-advance  model  (henceforth  called  CIA 
model) where money is assumed strictly essential for transactions. However, in a specific 
money-in-the-utility-function model (henceforth called MIUF model) they show that possible 
hyperinflationary paths are more likely when the transaction role of money becomes more 
important. They conclude that a CIA model is ‘a sensible approach to study hyperinflation 
since huge inflation rates cause credit transactions to vanish and money to become strictly 
essential for purchasing goods’. 
 
This paper uses an analytical approach and the precise definition of money essentiality given 
by  Scheinkman  (1980)  with  the  aim  to  establish  a  formal  theoretical  link  between  the 
                                                
2 This paper is not about speculative hyperinflations which are the focus of other works such as Brock (1975), 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983), Barbosa and da Cunha (2003) for instance. Speculative hyperinflations, as defined 
by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983), are explosive price-level paths unrelated to monetary growth. 
3 Evans (1995) and Vazquez (1998) provide a survey about the literature concerning this failure.   3 
possibility of hyperinflationary paths and the concept of money essentiality. In this respect the 
paper contributes to the understanding of the well known failure of Cagan based inflationary 
finance models to produce explosive hyperinflation. We extend to more generality the two 
standard  optimizing monetary  models  considered in  Gutierrez and Vazquez (2004)  which 
represent alternative ways of modelling the transaction role of money. The paper considers a 
MIUF model and a CIA model where representative agent’s preferences are represented by 
general  utility  functions.  We  show  that  modelling  monetary  hyperinflation  with  perfect 
foresight is closely linked to the concept of money essentiality as defined by Scheinkman 
(1980). The possibility of explosive monetary hyperinflation in a perfect foresight inflationary 
finance model always relies on a sufficient level of money essentiality. The main contribution 
of this paper is to show that, whether in a CIA or in a MIUF framework, this sufficient level 
of  money  essentiality  is  always  conveyed  by  the  representative  agent’s  preferences 
represented by its utility function and does not depend on the specific way, CIA or MIUF, of 
modelling the role of money as a medium of exchange. 
 
The paper is organized in the following way. In section 2, we consider an inflationary finance 
optimizing  MIUF  model  where  representative  agent’s  preferences  are  represented  by  a 
general  utility  function  to  relate  the  possibility  of  generating  explosive  monetary 
hyperinflations and the concept of money essentiality in the sense of Scheinkman (1980). In 
section 3, we consider an inflationary finance optimizing CIA model where representative 
agent’s  preferences  are  represented  by  a  general  utility  function  to  establish,  again,  the 
dependence of the possibility of generating explosive monetary hyperinflations on the concept 
of money essentiality. Interestingly, section 3 shows that money essentiality is not conveyed 
by the CIA specific way of modelling the transaction role of money but that it is conveyed by 
the agent’s preferences. Section 4 summarizes the results. 
 
 
2. MIUF economy, hyperinflation and money essentiality 
 
The optimizing monetary models considered in this paper assume a continuous time model 
where the economy consists of a large number of identical infinitely-lived forward looking 
households endowed with perfect foresight. Population is constant and its size is normalized 
to  unity  for  convenience.  There  is  no  uncertainty.  Each  household  has  a  non-produced 
constant endowment  0 y >  of the non-storable consumption good per unit of time. 
 
In the MIUF model the role of money as a medium of exchange is assumed to be captured by 
introducing real money balances into the household utility function. The set up draws on 
Sidrauski (1967) and Brock (1975). 
 






t t U c m e dt
¥
- ￿ .        (1) 
 
The instantaneous utility function is continuous, twice differentiable on
2
+ ￿ , increasing and 
strictly concave in 







=  his holdings of 
real monetary balances (M is the nominal stock of money, P is the price level). The rate  r is   4 
the subjective discount rate, which, following Calvo (1987), is assumed to be equal to the real 
rate of interest. Financial wealth and the nominal interest rate are defined as 
 
t t t m b w = + , 
t t i r p = + , 
 
respectively, where  t b denotes real per capita government debt,  t p is the inflation rate. The 
household’s budget constraint is 
 
( ) t t t t t t y r c i m w t w = - + - + ￿ ,         (2) 
 
where  t t is a lump-sum tax assumed to be constant. The household’s optimization problem 
















,          (3) 
 
where  ( ) , c t t U c m ¢   is constant  with  respect  to  time  because  the instantaneous  rate  of  time 
preference is equal to the real rate of interest. Condition (3) requires that at each moment the 
nominal  rate  of  interest  be  equal to  the  marginal  rate  of  substitution of  consumption  for 
money. It implicitly defines a demand for money as a function of the nominal interest rate i. 
Assuming ( ) , 0 cm U c m ¢¢ ³ , the strict concavity of the utility function U ensures that m and i are 
related  in  a  negative  fashion.  The  optimum  solution  is  completed  by  the  transversality 
condition: 
 
( ) lim , 0
rt
c t t t t e U c m w
-
®¥
¢ ￿ ￿= ￿ ￿ .          (4) 
 
 
The equilibrium condition in the goods market is 
 
t y c g = + ,            (5) 
 
where  g  is  the  constant  per  capita  government  expenditure  In  usual  inflationary  finance 









p = = +
￿
￿ .          (6) 
 
Substituting the value of  p  extracted from first-order equation (3) in the latter expression 
leads to the inflationary finance model dynamics described by the following law of motion for 
real cash balances: 









m d r m
U c m
￿ ￿ ¢
= - - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ¢ ￿ ￿
￿ .       (7) 
 
The differential equation (7) provides a complete characterization of real per-capita money 
balances dynamics which will be studied by using the technique of phase diagram on[ [ 0;+¥ . 
The  main  interesting  point  here  is  to  examine  whether  this  law  of  motion  for  real  cash 
balances is able to produce monetary hyperinflation paths. A monetary hyperinflation path 
will be observed if the law of motion presents a path leading to a zero level of real cash 
balances.  Therefore,  the  conditions  for  this  kind  of  paths  should  be  identified.  As  the 
mathematical  function  representing  the  law  of  motion  is  continuous  (which  is  true  with 
standard assumptions on U) this kind of paths will be observed as long as (dropping index 




+ ® < ￿ .          (8) 
 
The  calculation  of  lim
m m
®+¥
￿   will  assess  the  existence  of  any  steady  state.  Nevertheless, 
whatever the number of steady states, we are only interested in the paths starting at the left of 
the first possible steady state when the condition 
0 lim 0
m m
+ ® < ￿   is met. 
 
At this stage a second highly important point should be made clear. According to Obstfeld 
and Rogoff (1983) in the context of speculative hyperinflations issue, any path leading to a 
zero value of real cash balances and crossing eventually the vertical axis at some finite point 
should be ruled out on grounds that such paths would not be feasible because the real stock of 
money would eventually become negative. However, we would rather follow the point made 
by Barbosa and Cunha (2003) who contested the Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983) approach by 
arguing that on such hyperinflationary paths when the real quantity of money reaches zero 
hyperinflation would have wiped out the value of money, the opportunity cost of holding 
money  would  have  become  infinite,  and  the  economy  would  no  longer  be  a  monetary 
economy. Therefore, we follow the point made by Barbosa and Cunha (2003) and consider 
the  monetary  hyperinflation  paths  corresponding  to  the  condition 
0 lim 0
m m
+ ® < ￿   as  perfect 
foresight competitive equilibrium paths. 
 
Moreover,  it’s  important  to  stress  that  the  possible  hyperinflationary  paths  are  monetary 
hyperinflations because along these paths the rate of growth of the money supply explodes. 






,             
  
we see that along the paths of continuously declining m, given that  0, d > the growth rate of 
money supply increases continuously. 
 
In this respect, according to the law of motion (7), the possibility of explosive monetary 
hyperinflation will depend on the condition 











U c m + ®
￿ ￿ ¢
> ￿ ￿ ¢ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
.          (9) 
 
The latter condition is basically a condition about a sufficient level of money essentiality. 
Scheinkman  (1980)  defines  the  essentiality  of  money  as  the  fact  that  “money  is  very 
necessary  to  the  system”.  According  to  his  definition,  money  essentiality  relates  to  the 
evolution of inflation tax collected by government when the rate of inflation explodes. Money 
is considered as essential if the inflation tax collected by the government does not tend to zero 
when the rate of inflation explodes. From (6) we see that seigniorage obtained by printing 
money can be decomposed into two components, the change in the real stock of money and 
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.        (10) 
 
Then, when the rate of inflation explodes we consider 
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+ + ® ®
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.        (11) 
 










U c m + ®
￿ ￿ ¢
> ￿ ￿ ¢ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
  then 
0 lim 0
m m p
+ ® >   and  money  is  essential.  These 
findings enable us to formulate a first proposition. 
 
Proposition  1:  In  a  general  MIUF  optimizing  monetary  framework,  explosive  monetary 











U c m + ®
￿ ￿ ¢
> ￿ ￿ ¢ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
. 
 
Proof: The proof relies on the previous arguments and can be illustrated by the phase diagram 
depicted on Figure 1. The precise shape of the phase diagram depends on the first and second 
derivative of  m ￿  with respect to m. Other shapes than that depicted on Figure 1 could be 
possible for the phase locus. However, as the important point for the analysis conducted here 
insists on the condition for
0 lim 0
m m
+ ® < ￿ , our analysis focuses only on the paths leading to a zero 
value of real cash balances. If lim 0
m m
®+¥ > ￿ , the locus  m ￿  will cross the horizontal axis at least 
once. We consider here a  unique  unstable steady state 
* m but the qualitative analysis  for 
hyperinflationary paths doesn’t change in the case of more steady states. All paths originating 
at the right of m* are hyperdeflationary paths that can be ruled out because violating the 
transversality condition (4). All paths starting to the left of m* are monetary hyperinflations 
paths.￿ 
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Figure 1: Monetary dynamics in a MIUF economy with money sufficiently essential 
 
In the choice of a particular constant-relative-risk-aversion utility function like 
 













= ,          (12) 
 
as in Gutierrez and Vazquez (2004), the parameter w  (0 1 w £ £ ) is supposed measuring the 
transaction  requirement  of  money.  One  can  easily  show  that  the  latter  utility  function 
represents agent’s preferences which comply with Proposition 1 requirement only if money is 







Furthermore,  considering  the  case  where  the  utility  function  is  additively  separable  in 
consumption and real cash balances: 
 
( ) , ( ) ( ) t t t t U c m u c v m = + ,        (13) 
 
where  the  functions  u  and  v  are  increasing  in  their  arguments  and  strictly  concave,  the 
condition (9) of Proposition 1 resumes to 
 
[ ]
0 lim ( ) ( )
m mv m du c
+ ®
¢ ¢ > .        (14)  
 
In the latter condition the value of  ( ) u c ¢ is constant with respect to time. Scheinkman (1980) 
identified the condition 
0 lim ( ) 0
m mv m
+ ®
¢ >  to the essentiality of money. The condition (14), as a 
particular  case  of  Proposition  1,  states  that  the  possibility  of  explosive  monetary 
hyperinflation depends on a sufficient level of money essentiality which is conveyed by the 
utility function for money services. 
 
 
3. Cash-In-Advance economy, hyperinflation and money essentiality 
m ￿  
 
m  0 
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The framework of the CIA model considered in this section is the same as that considered in 
the previous section. The CIA model considered here differs from that of the MIUF in two 
aspects. First, the representative household’s preferences are represented by the following 





t e U c dt
¥
- ￿ .           (15) 
The function U is increasing and strictly concave in its argument, real good consumption. 
Second, in a CIA economy the role of money as a medium of exchange is captured by a cash-
in-advance  constraint  assuming  that  money  holding  is  strictly  essential  to  buy  the 
consumption  good.  In  order  to  consume  c  units  of  the  consumption  good  at  time  t,  the 
household must hold a stock of real cash balances, m, greater or equal to c: 
 
t t m c ³             (16) 
 
Assuming the existence of an interior solution for c, and that the nominal interest rate i is 
greater than zero, meaning that money is return-dominated by government bond, it follows 
that CIA constraint (16) must hold with equality: 
 
t t m c = .           (16)’ 
 
The representative household optimization problem consisting of maximizing (15) subject to 
the constraints given by (2) and (16)’ leads to the following first order condition 
 
( ) ( ) 1 t t U m i l ¢ = + ,          (17) 
 
where l  is the associated Lagrange multiplier which is constant with respect to time because 
the agent’s rate of time preference equals the real rate of interest, and real cash balances will 
indirectly enter the utility function according to (16)’. Equation (17) characterizes a demand 
for real money balances decreasing with respect to the rate of inflation (or the cost of holding 





t t e lw
-
®¥ = .          (18) 
 
By using the definition of the nominal interest rate, the first order condition (17) can be 
written as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) 1 t
t




= .          (19) 
 
As in usual inflationary finance models a constant per capita share of government’s budget 
deficit, d, is financed by issuing high-powered money, the law of motion for real money 
balances in this CIA inflationary finance model will be given by combining (6) and (19), 
leading to 
   9 
( ) ( )
1
( ) 1 t t t m d U m r m l
l
¢ = - - + ￿ .        (20) 
 
On the basis of the methodology and the argumentation developed in section 2, the possibility 
of explosive monetary hyperinflation paths depends on condition (8) leading to the following 
condition in the CIA current economy (dropping the time index for convenience) 
 
[ ]
0 lim ( )
m mU m d l
+ ®
¢ > .         (21) 
 
In the same way as in section 2 in the framework of a MIUF economy, the condition (21) 
relates the possibility of explosive monetary hyperinflation to a sufficient level of money 
essentiality which is conveyed by the agent’s preferences. The Scheinkman (1980) definition 
of money essentiality considers the evolution of inflation tax collected by government when 
the rate of inflation explodes. Money is considered as essential if the inflation tax collected by 
the government does not tend to zero when the rate of inflation explodes. According to (19), 
inflation tax is given by 
 





¢ ￿ ￿ - +
= ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
.        (22) 
 
Then, when the rate of inflation explodes we consider 
 
[ ] [ ]
0 0
1
lim lim ( )
m m m mU m p
l + + ® ®
¢ = .      (23) 
 
From the mathematical point of view it appears that the condition (21) allowing the model to 
generate possible monetary hyperinflations paths is exactly of the same kind as the condition 
(9) in the general MIUF model. The condition (21) is particularly similar to the condition (14) 
in the MIUF case with an additive separable utility function. 
 
Proposition  2:  In  a  CIA  optimizing  monetary  framework  with  a  general  utility  function, 
explosive monetary hyperinflations are possible only if money is sufficiently essential that is if 
[ ]
0 lim ( )
m mU m d l
+ ®
¢ > . 
 
Proof: The proof relies on previous arguments.￿ 
 
The possibility of monetary hyperinflation paths is again a discussion about a sufficient level 
of money essentiality, and is not linked to the specificity of the CIA framework. The CIA 
framework  is not  sufficient in  itself to  ensure the possibility  of explosive hyperinflations 
paths. 
 












= ,          (24) 
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with 1 a > ,  as  in  Gutierrez  and  Vazquez  (2004),  implies  agent’s  preferences  which  are 
compatible  with  the  possibility  of  explosive  monetary  hyperinflation.  The  latter  utility 
function complies with the condition (20) of Proposition 2 since we have 
 
[ ]
0 lim ( )
m mU m d l
+ ®
¢ = +¥ >           (25) 
 
The interesting results obtained in Gutierrez and Vazquez (2004) don’t rely on the specificity 
of the CIA framework but rather on a sufficient level of money essentiality which is conveyed 
by the choice of the utility function given by (24). CIA constraint doesn’t convey by itself 





Several studies of economic exchange during hyperinflationary episodes report that the use of 
money  is  more  essential  during  extreme  inflations  than  during  stable  periods.  Extreme 
inflation  dramatically  decreases  credit  transactions  and  in  general  the  use  of  long  term 
contracts.  This  paper  studies  the  theoretical  relation  between  the  possibility  of  explosive 
monetary hyperinflation and the concept of money essentiality as defined by Scheinkman 
(1980).  Hyperinflationary  dynamics  are  characterized  using  two  standard  optimizing 
monetary models representing alternative ways of modelling the transaction role of money: a 
money-in-the-utility-function model and a cash-in-advance model with general representative 
agents’ preferences. 
 
The first contribution of the paper is to show that in both models the possibility of explosive 
monetary hyperinflations, defined as speeding up inflation processes driven by an inflationary 
finance  policy,  depends  on  a  sufficient  level  of  money  essentiality.  Money  has  to  be 
sufficiently essential to the system, in the precise sense given by Scheinkman (1980), in order 
to make possible the occurrence of explosive monetary hyperinflation in inflationary finance 
models. The sufficient money essentiality requirement is consistent with the fact that money 
becomes more essential for purchasing goods during hyperinflation. It is also consistent with 
the design of inflationary finance models of hyperinflation since the government needs the 
money to be essential to the system in order to get sufficient inflation tax when inflation 
explodes. 
 
The second contribution of the paper is to show that the essentiality of money requirement 
doesn’t  depend  on  the  specific  way  used  to  model  the  role  of  money  as  a  medium  of 
exchange,  cash-in-advance  or  money-in-the-utility-function.  We  show  that  the  interesting 
results of Gutierrez and Vazquez (2004) can be thought as particular cases of our analysis, but 
we depart from the latter by showing that the cash-in-advance framework in itself does not 
convey  the  essentiality  of  money.  The  sufficient  level  of  money  essentiality  is,  in  both 
models, showed to be conveyed by the representative agents’ preferences. In this respect, the 
paper  may  contribute to  the  understanding  of the  well  known Cagan  inflationary  finance 
model failure with perfect foresight and may stimulate further research for the choice of an 
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